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Mechanism-Based Thinking on Policy Diffusion 
A Review of Current Approaches in Political Science
Torben Heinze
Abstract
Despite theoretical and methodological progress in what is now coined as the third generation of diffusion 
studies, explicitly dealing with the causal mechanisms underlying diffusion processes and comparatively 
analyzing them is only of recent date. As a matter of fact, diffusion research has ended up in a diverse 
and often unconnected array of theoretical assumptions relying both on rational as well as constructivist 
reasoning – a circumstance calling for more theoretical coherence and consistency. Against this backdrop, 
this paper reviews and streamlines diffusion literature in political science. Diffusion mechanisms largely 
cluster around two causal arguments determining the desires and preferences of actors for choosing alter-
native policies. First, existing diffusion mechanisms accounts can be grouped according to the rationality 
for policy adoption, this means that government behavior is based on the instrumental considerations of 
actors or on constructivist arguments like norms and rule-driven actors. Second, diffusion mechanisms 
can either directly impact on the beliefs of actors or they might influence the structural conditions for 
decision-making. Following this logic, four basic diffusion mechanisms can be identified in mechanism-
based thinking on policy diffusion: emulation, socialization, learning, and externalities.
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1. Introduction
A growing number of political scientists started to write about the interdependencies between countries1 
and the phenomena of policy diffusion. More specifically, empirical analyses on the spatial and temporal 
clustering of public policies are increasingly focusing on the underlying causal mechanisms that are driving 
policy transfer (cf. Elkins/Simmons 2005; Franzese/Hays 2008; Graham et al. 2008; Holzinger et al. 2007; 
Meseguer/Gilardi 2005; Simmons et al. 2007). 
Causal mechanisms relate to processes of diffusion such as learning, competition, coercion, and socializa-
tion (cf. Graham et al. 2008).2 They can be described as “sequences of causally linked [social] events that 
occur repeatedly in reality if certain conditions are given” (Mayntz 2004: 241). This means identifying 
diffusion mechanisms usually includes formulating a theoretical pathway, including not only the stimulus 
(the independent variable) and the response (the dependent variable), but also intervening steps linking 
cause and effect. Instead of conceptualizing diffusion as a dependent or independent variable, the majority 
of studies is following a process-orientated understanding of the empirical phenomena (Elkins/Simmons 
2005).
Hence, the theoretical concept of policy diffusion can be described as “any process where prior adoption 
of a trait or practice in a population alters the probability of adoption for remaining non-adopters” (Strang 
1991: 325). To put it differently, diffusion research usually3 focuses on policy change and adoption as de-
pendent variables, but follows mechanism-based explanations underlying the whole causal process. This 
includes not only the trigger of the adoption process, but its intervening causal steps as well as its outcome 
in terms of if and when the adoption of a specific policy takes places.
Despite theoretical and methodological progress in what is now coined as the third generation of diffusion 
studies (cf. Howlett/Rayner 2008), explicitly dealing with the causal mechanisms underlying diffusion pro-
cesses and their comparative analyses is only of recent date (for example  Boehmke/Witmer 2004; Daley/
Garand 2005; Dobbin et al. 2007; Shipan/Volden 2008). As a matter of fact, diffusion research has ended up 
in a diverse and often unconnected array of theoretical assumptions relying both on rational as well as on 
constructivist reasoning. This circumstance not only calls for a less ideological approach when it comes to 
testing the (opposing) paradigms underlying theories of social action (cf. Fearon/Wendt 2002; Risse 2003), 
1 Other forms of interdependence refer to vertical interdependencies in multi-level systems (for example between 
international organizations and states or between federal and sub-national entities) or sector-related interde-
pendencies (cf. Bönker 2008). The main focus of this paper is on intergovernmental linkages.
2 It is not always clear what kinds of processes have to be subsumed under policy diffusion. Some authors incor-
porate coercive adaption processes into the study of diffusion whereas others only apply the concept to mecha-
nisms based on voluntariness.
3 More recent attempts try to discriminate between different aspects of diffusion processes regarding the overall 
outcome of these processes and mechanisms (for example in terms of temporal patterns like the speed or the 
duration of adaption processes). The underlying argument is that analyzing different temporal aspects of diffu-
sion mechanisms can help controlling for and discriminating between causal mechanisms (cf. Grzymala-Busse 
2011).
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but also for more theoretical coherence and consistency (cf. Braun/Gilardi 2006; Meseguer/Gilardi 2005). 
Against this backdrop, this paper systematically extracts four basic pathways of diffusion from mechanism-
based thinking on policy diffusion.
Several taxonomies and classifications of diffusion processes and mechanism-based thinking can be found 
in the existing literature. Still most of them lack analytical clarity. These classes of adaption mechanisms are 
to a great deal constructed according to research strands or methodological concerns rather than based 
on their theoretical background. As a consequence, diffusion research not only lacks a common wording 
and terminology (cf. Graham et al. 2008), but theoretical assumptions are often vague and overlapping 
(Meseguer/Gilardi 2009). However, conceptualizations that are not based on a distinct and precise set 
of causal propositions render the need to find observable and (preferably) distinct empirical indicators 
opaque (cf. Elkins/Simmons 2005: 38; Gerring 1999) – a serious obstacle for valid and robust empirical 
testing of theoretical models.
Existing work usually pinpoints diffusion patterns as being too complex to generate (simple) (dis-)equi-
libria for identifying the conditions of policy diffusion (cf. Braun/Gilardi 2006; Mooney 2001) and recent 
attempts to formalize diffusion processes are highly specific by theorizing only singular diffusion mecha-
nisms like learning or competitive interdependence (for example  Franzese/Hays 2008; Volden et al. 2008). 
Approaches trying to deal with the complexities of diffusion processes only provide simple threshold mod-
els that mix different constructivist reasoning under the framework of utilitarianism (for example Braun/
Gilardi 2006). 
In addition, mechanism-based approaches usually lack the integration of scope conditions and conditional 
variables. More specific, the contingent character of policy diffusion requires the explicit formulation of 
an interaction hypothesis (cf. Volden 2006). Although context is especially important in mechanism-based 
thinking as it encompasses several steps in a causal process (cf. Falleti/Lynch 2009), this approach is still 
underdeveloped in diffusion research.
Consequently, it is the objective of this paper to disentangle and review theoretical arguments by presenting 
a systematic classification of causal propositions on diffusion mechanisms. Relying upon insights from exist-
ing studies dealing with policy diffusion and related literature on similar concepts such as Europeanization, 
policy transfer, convergence, isomorphism, or learning (cf. Marsh/Sharman 2009),4 I subscribe to a stricter 
use of the term diffusion relating only to voluntary processes of policy adaption.
Largely, mechanism-based thinking clusters around two causal arguments determining the desires and 
preferences of actors for alternative policies. First, existing diffusion mechanisms accounts can be grouped 
according to the rationality for policy adoption – what drives governments’ behavior? Analytically diffusion 
mechanisms refer to rationalist reasoning based on instrumental considerations of actors or on construc-
tivist arguments such as norms and rule-driven actors. Second, causal mechanisms differ according to their 
impact on the properties of policy choice. Whereas diffusion mechanisms can have a direct impact on the 
beliefs of actors, they might also influence the structural conditions for decision-making. 
4 The focus is still on a diffusion perspective, this means the interest is on processes on the macro-level.
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Following this causal logic, four classes of causal mechanisms can be identified in the current state of the 
art: emulation, learning, socialization, and externalities. Whereas learning and socialization coins behav-
ioral change due to an update of actors’ beliefs and preferences, emulation and externalities as understood 
here refer to theoretical assumptions based on structural explanations. All four of them can provide theo-
retical frameworks for empirically testing diffusion processes and their effects.5
The paper proceeds as follows: First, in order to analyze diffusion, differences, and intersections within 
mechanism-based thinking in diffusion research are highlighted. Despite ontological differences, theoreti-
cal developments seem to be more complex than the division between rationalism and constructivism sug-
gests. To limit the scope of this paper, the main focus is on works in political science centering on empirical 
testing. Furthermore, the reader has to be aware of the fact that the paper does not conceptualize diffu-
sion as a dependent variable, but follows a process-orientated understanding of policy diffusion. Rather 
than treating diffusion as a single causal factor or mechanism, the term diffusion refers to different causal 
mechanisms influencing the adoption of public policies. In doing so, one certainly has to acknowledge the 
importance of earlier works conceptualizing diffusion as an outcome and focusing on the overall patterns 
in the diffusion of (whatsoever) innovation (for example S-shaped spreading) (cf. Rogers 2003). Second, 
four classes of diffusion mechanisms are conceptualized. This also includes dealing with the conditional 
nature of each class of diffusion mechanism identified. Finally, possibilities for future empirical research 
based on this framework are considered. 
2. Differences and Intersections in Mechanism-Based Thinking on Policy Diffusion
Originally dealing with the spread of all kinds of (technological) innovations, diffusion research is nowadays 
analyzing all kinds of policy change and transfer – ranging from the adoption of specific approaches and 
policy instruments to more encompassing forms of policy transfer linked to the adoption of organizational 
forms and institutions (cf. Rogers 2003; Strang/Soule 1998). Overall, studying policy diffusion can be de-
scribed by different spatial, temporal, and substantial foci.
As a matter of fact, the field is still organized according to the different sub-disciplines of political science 
(cf. Graham et al. 2008). A diverse array of diffusion mechanisms and corresponding classifications can be 
found in the existing literature (for example Elkins/Simmons 2005), but a general and clear-cut theory on 
the causes and effects of the different diffusion processes is still missing (cf. Braun/Gilardi 2006). From this 
point of view, mapping the different pathways of policy diffusion becomes a first step in making theoretical 
arguments less vague and in providing common sense on how diffusion mechanisms can work.
Mechanism-based approaches are forcing scholars to explicitly deal with theory as it is based on spelling 
out an underlying causal chain rather than merely formulating assumptions on covariates (Graham et al. 
2008: 28; Gerring 2007). From this point of view, the focus of this section is on the question why diffusion 
5 Providing a mathematical analysis of formal models would go beyond the scope of this paper. We still lack con-
siderable knowledge on diffusion processes, their interaction, and their effects on policy change and adaption to 
specify a fully developed formal model of several diffusion processes.
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effects unfold rather than on how the overall pattern of diffusion looks like or through what informational 
sources (some would call it channels) policies spread (for example Jordana et al. 2011; Rogers 2003). More 
specifically, such an explanatory strategy gives different research designs and approaches a common theo-
retical ground. Furthermore, causal mechanisms do not only tell us about the intervening steps between 
a cause and effects. They are also based on a micro-foundation of causal relationships (cf. Coleman 1990). 
To put it differently, although the stimulus triggering an event to occur is often located on the macro-level 
of collective action,6 theoretical assumptions also specify how these mechanisms operate through the 
individual level. From this point of view, research designs based on such mechanisms give the possibility 
to concentrate on different analytical levels (for example the micro- or macro-level) (cf. Kittel 2006) or on 
different steps in a causal chain (cf. King et al. 1994).7 
However, the question how to map the different pathways of diffusion still arises. Scholars working on 
policy diffusion expect the different diffusion processes and the associated causal mechanisms to have –at 
least analytically– distinct empirical effects and outcomes (cf. Elkins/Simmons 2005). Reviewing mecha-
nism-based thinking in studies dealing with policy diffusion, a vast number of causal mechanisms can be 
identified. Following a systematic mapping according to the underlying causal logic of diffusion mecha-
nisms, existing theoretical arguments can be clustered according to two analytical questions (cf. figure 1).
Figure 1: A Venn Diagram of Policy Diffusion Mechanisms
Source: own figure based on section three
6 Or on the meso-level in case of a multi-level perspective.
7 That does not imply that a micro-foundation is a necessary condition for formulating a causal theory. For a more 
critical view on mechanism-based thinking see Gerring (2010).
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2.1		 Constructivist	and	Rationalist	Thinking
First, regarding policy diffusion, one can ask what motivates actors to adopt a new policy. What is the 
underlying logic behind their actions? As for policy diffusion, it boils down to the question what logic drives 
government behavior. Reflecting the distinction between rationalist and constructivist arguments,8 exist-
ing diffusion mechanisms accounts can be grouped according to the rationality for policy adoption. Actors 
might consider policy transfer and adaption due to instrumental or normative reasons and motivations, 
respectively. While the former primarily relates to material preferences, interests, and desires, the later 
logic is linked to actors’ interest constituted by social expectations, values, and rule-driven behavior. This 
compounds the classical institutionalist reasoning by March and Olsen concerning the underlying logic 
of social action, this means the logic of consequentialism and the logic of appropriateness (March/Olsen 
1989; see also Börzel/Risse 2003).
Following the former, actors are usually supposed to be utility-maximizing individuals that choose goal-ori-
entated solutions. Usually, actors are modeled as having fixed and sorted preferences and interests. These 
parameters are exogenously given (cf. Fearon/Wendt 2002: 62f). It is only preferences over means, actions, 
or strategies that are supposed to change, but not preferences over ends and outcomes. Actor’s behavior 
then is instrumental according to their interests and preferences (or desires), their available resources and 
opportunities as well as their expectations and beliefs regarding the effects of their own behavior. To put 
it differently, acting takes place according to the expected consequences of actors’ choices. That does not 
mean that actors are only following their self-interest, but they rather might also incorporate social and 
ideational values into their expected utility maximizations. 
Yet, domestic policy makers might also choose certain policies as it seems appropriate to do so. Diffusion 
mechanisms referring to constructivist thinking are usually based on the assumption that actors’ behavior 
is rule-based, meaning that actors are following mutually shared understandings and beliefs of appropriate 
behavior.9 Thus, rather than thinking about the consequences of their choices, actors decide according to 
situational interpretations and upon the rightness of their actions (cf. Sending 2002; Sjöblom 1993).10 
8 I use the term „reflecting“ as there seems no exclusive and clear-cut definition of rationalism and constructivism 
(cf. Fearon/Wendt 2002).
9 In this regard, some distinguish the logic of arguing (e.g. Risse 2000). As March and Olsen themselves subsume 
this logic under the “logic of appropriateness” (1989; 1998), I will not deal with mechanisms such as persuasion 
or arguing separately. Especially since arguing seems primarily about norm formation (Finnemore/Sikkink 1998), 
whereas the theoretical starting here is on policy adoption.
10 As a matter of fact, the constructivist program often aims at rules and social structures rather than at agency-
orientation and individuals. In constructivist debates, the question about choice is not as straightforward as in 
rationalist approaches. Actors following the logic of appropriateness still have to interpret and decide upon the 
rightness of their actions. From this point of view, I deviate from March and Olsen’s assumptions as it is question-
able how far their constructivist reasoning allows for external impacts on actor’s motivations to follow a rule or 
norm (cf. Sending 2002: 454).
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2.2		 Explanations	Based	on	Changes	in	Structures	and/or	Agency	
Second, causal mechanisms differ according to their impact on the properties of policy choice (cf. Braun/
Gilardi 2006; Schimmelfennig 2007; Simmons/Elkins 2004). Although diffusion approaches are dealing with 
all kind of interdependent decision-making, it is mostly the national government that constitutes the unit 
of analysis. The reason is simply that governments are usually the main actors who have to decide upon 
changing existing policies.11 However, what determines the actual decision-making and actions of national 
governments? Regardless of whether governments follow a normative and/or instrumental rationality, ac-
tion theory in its most basic form assumes that choices and consequent actions (if intentional)12 are jointly 
caused by the actor’s perceptions and beliefs on the policies in question as well as on their specific interest, 
desires, and preferences (cf. Fearon/Wendt 2002: 55; Searle 2001).
While diffusion mechanisms can have a direct impact on actors’ beliefs, they might also influence the struc-
tures that are underlying decision-making. Both kinds of processes can determine the preferences of actors 
for alternative policies. In other words, mechanism-based thinking can also be clustered according to the 
assumption on what induces the diffusion of policies. Is the stimulus and/or the trigger of the causal mech-
anism changing the internal properties of the actor or leading to altered decision-making conditions? In 
the prior case, the functioning of the diffusion mechanism and consequent actions are based on changing 
internal factors and intrinsic motivations of decision-makers, whereas in the latter case actors are adapting 
their specific interest and desires to altered constraints and opportunities underlying decision-making.
In a more rationalist reading, actors base their decisions on the consequences of alternative policies. To 
calculate the consequences of their actions, agents have to cognitively link policies with their self-interest; 
thus, they simply have to know about the efficiency of alternative policy choices. This notion is carried in 
cognitive or causal ideas and beliefs over cause and effect relationships and strategies for the attainment 
of goals (cf. Goldstein/Keohane 1993; Schmidt 2008). Actors have to ask if the policy under consideration 
is effective for achieving their goals and desires. Several diffusion concepts are based on shared causal or 
cognitive ideas and beliefs. For example, lesson drawing is based on the assumption that actors update 
their causal beliefs on new information on the functioning of policies (Rose 1991). Actors share beliefs 
on means and ends and diffusion processes can influence these cognitive perceptions and beliefs on the 
policies in question. 
Diffusion processes then can change the outcome of decision-making by influencing the conditions un-
derlying decision-making (cf. Braun/Gilardi 2006; Schimmelfennig 2007; Simmons/Elkins 2004). Is there a 
change in the payoffs linked with different policy choices? If the actors’ desire is to maximize the utility as-
sociated with policy choices, then they likely will adapt to new constraints and opportunities. Payoffs refer 
to the costs and benefits associated with a specific policy. Preference for a specific policy can be based on 
the expected electoral rewards, party politics or organized interests and lobbying. Sometimes, benefits are 
structured by the need to arrive at package deals or in bargaining situations (for example in government 
formation). Yet, payoffs can also be based on economic rewards and competition. 
11 I use the word “usually” as sometimes the national competencies remain on a sub-national level. Also, adopting 
policies might stem from coercive impacts as in the case of international law. The existence of veto players has 
also to be taken into account.
12 Some constructivist authors argue against the intentionality of rule-driven behavior (cf. footnote ten).
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In a similar vein, constructivist thinking in diffusion research can be ordered according to its impact. Actions 
are based on rules, this means that actors are following mutually shared understandings on correct and 
appropriate behavior. However, what determines the appropriateness of rules? Like rationalist arguments 
on causal beliefs, actors have to cognitively link policies with their social and normative interest and desire 
to answer this question. Basically, this argument is about pairing action with a specific situation. What 
do I believe what are (non-) appropriate policy choices in a specific situation? Furthermore, what are the 
criteria for distinguishing the appropriateness of policies? Consequently, diffusion mechanisms are based 
on the assumption that actors’ behavior is based on “normative” (Schmidt 2008) or “principled” beliefs 
(Goldstein/Keohane 1993). Rules are followed as long as actors accept them as true and natural choices. 
How do I have to act according to my identity and the role I am supposed to play? For example, certain 
rules are just taken for granted like abolishing slavery (Finnemore/Sikkink 1998: 895). Due to internalized 
values and norms, action becomes independent of material consideration since actors have an intrinsic 
desire to follow that norm (cf. Alderson 2001; Checkel 2005). This idea applies to concepts like persuasion 
or socialization.
Yet, diffusion mechanisms can also relate to a change in the conditions framing the agent’s decision-making. 
For instance, the emergence of international norms can alter the normative structures underlying world 
politics and it can render the adoption of a specific policy as a more appropriate and legitimate choice (cf. 
Finnemore 1996). In other words, they are determining the normative value of alternative policy choices 
embedded in the institutional and cultural structure within the actor operates. Which policies are socially 
rewarding? Which norms are socially accepted in a given situation? This reframing in the interpretation 
and projection of the appropriateness associated with the adoption of alternative policy choices can be 
found in conceptualizations like mimicry or emulation when actors are driven by legitimacy pressures and/
or the desire for conformity (cf. Sharman 2008). Rather than becoming intrinsic to actors’ identities, rules 
are followed as they are interpreted as legitimate and right.
2.3	 Four	Concepts	of	Diffusion	Mechanisms				
Both paradigms should not be interpreted too narrowly. Rationalist and constructivist thinking are partly 
overlapping. For example, the basic distinction sometimes drawn between normative and instrumental 
rationality does not fully intersect with the ideational versus material dichotomy and can turn out to be 
misleading (cf. Fearon/Wendt 2002; Klotz/Lynch 2006). Causal beliefs are usually linked with the material 
interest of an actor as they determine the expected utility of a policy (cf. Braun/Gilardi 2006) rather than the 
rightness of policy choices.13 Still, causal beliefs about the effects of a specific policy is an ideational concept 
like norms or discourse and is part of constructivist thinking, too (for example in processes based on argu-
ing). Actors might also incorporate social and ideational values into their expected utility maximizations.
However, rationalist notions also found their way into constructivist thinking. For instance, at first internal-
izing new norms might be driven by an instrumental rather than a normative rationale (cf. Checkel 2005). 
Or diffusion mechanisms such as persuasion or arguing referring to scientific knowledge not only change 
13 Except when effectiveness becomes the appropriate norm Except when effectiveness becomes the appropriate 
norm.
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normative beliefs, but can also persuade actors to link causes and effects with regard to distinct problem-
solving approaches. Vice versa, one can also identify a few rationalist concepts like complex or second or-
der learning that assume learning beyond strategies and conceptualize actor’s preferences as endogenous 
(cf. Hall 1993).
Hence, the distinction between constructivist and rationalist thinking is not as sharp as often claimed. In 
diffusion research, both schools of thought evolved around altering beliefs and structures. Consequently, 
four ideal types of causal mechanisms can be identified: learning, socialization, emulation, and externali-
ties (cf. table 1). Learning then relates to situations where national governments rely on experiences made 
elsewhere for domestic problem solving. The rationality for this behavior rests on searching effective solu-
tions to given problems, based on the idea that the experience of others provides information to solve 
one’s own problems. In turn, this will lead to an updating of causal ideas and to additional knowledge on 
the effectiveness of certain policies. In a similar vein, socialization relates to the internalization of shared 
beliefs due to the interaction of actors. In this regard, diffusion through socialization clearly frames the 
cognitive dimension of appropriate rules as this might lead to a redefinition of actor’s identities and belief 
systems as well as the internalization of international norms.
Externalities then characterize diffusion mechanisms based on setting (positive or negative) incentives for 
the adoption of certain policies, probably stemming from competitive interdependencies which change 
the cost-benefit ratio of domestic actors or from the direct impact of international policy instruments 
on domestic actors and institutions (for example through capacity-building). Both mechanisms can put 
adaptive pressure on domestic actors by altering the conditions under which decisions are made. Actors’ 
interests and desires to purse certain policies might change. In a similar vein, emulation describes the 
desire (or need) of domestic actors to conform to internationally widespread norms. Here, actors merely 
copy models found elsewhere to increase the legitimacy of policy choices. Usually, emulation relates to 
legitimacy pressures stemming from the misfit between internationally acclaimed norms and policies and 
their domestic counterparts.
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Table 1: Ideal Types of Policy Diffusion Mechanisms
Source: Own table based on section three
This approach does not imply that hybrid forms of diffusion mechanisms exist which cut across the causal 
logics presented (cf. figure 1). Causal mechanisms such as persuasion rely both on rational as well as on 
constructivist thinking. However, this does not mean that structural changes might not ultimately cause a 
change in actors’ beliefs in terms of socialization or learning effects. For example, in case of institutional 
learning policy makers and civil servants in specific institutional settings might incrementally adapt their 
political values to the organizational norms (cf. Rohrschneider 1996).
Now, one could argue that it is the adaption of actors to their structural environment that leads to an 
update of their beliefs. From this point of view, structural conditions seem to lead to the internalization of 
norms. Yet, analytically, a structural change is not sufficient for norm internalization. On the contrary, the 
original desire to conform to altered structural conditions can indirectly and ultimately lead to a change 
of the actor’s beliefs (cf. Checkel 2005). Consequently, it could be argued that structural and actor-based 
explanations differ in terms of the degree of change and the length of the causal chain under consideration. 
However, that would be a very bold statement to make. Here it seems helpful to remember that the ideal 
types constructed in this paper merely reflect different theoretical ideas about the main drivers for social 
action (actors’ beliefs and the structural conditions). They should be used as labels and connotations, not 
as normative claims about the superiority of either agency or structure in determining social actions. This is 
an issue for actual empirical research rather than for conceptual work, but elaborating on each class of dif-
fusion mechanism and (some of) its causal propositions in more detail could help to discriminate between 
the theoretical assumptions. 
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3.  Pathways of Policy Diffusion
It should be possible to subsume any mechanism found in the literature under distinct theoretical assump-
tions about the causal chain between triggers of diffusion processes and their effects (Elkins/Simmons 
2005: 38). Yet, due to the prevailing problem of overlapping theoretical assumptions, it still remains a 
theoretical and empirical challenge to discriminate between different diffusion mechanisms. Consequently, 
this paper tries to disentangle theoretical arguments by providing a coherent and systematic mapping14 of 
current conceptualizations according to the causal ideas described in the previous section.
The following discussion of four basic conceptualizations deals more specifically with the functioning of 
different diffusion mechanisms by taking both the trigger of the adoption process, its intervening causal 
steps, and its expected outcome in terms of policy adoption into consideration. In doing so, the section also 
deals with the contingent nature of policy diffusion by elaborating on the interaction between the different 
diffusion processes and their conditional variables.
As a matter of fact, the presentation is not a comprehensive list of explanatory factors to be found in diffu-
sion research. Instead, the selection of theoretical assumptions discussed in the following section is rather 
informed by existing empirical records. Reviewing the relevant literature, one has to acknowledge that 
it is particularly the number of potentially relevant conditional factors that seems to be endless – espe-
cially, if someone is utilizing neighboring research strands like Europeanization and policy convergence (for 
example Mastenbroek 2005). Therefore, the following sections only deal with a selection of conditional 
variables.
3.1	 Conceptualizing	Learning				
Policy diffusion due to learning refers to constellations where governments rationally utilize experiences 
of external actors in order to solve domestic problems. The rationality for this behavior rests on searching 
effective solutions to given problems, based on the idea that the experience of others provides informa-
tion to solve one’s own problems. Rather than changing the decision-making conditions by altering payoffs, 
learning relates to situations where national governments update their causal beliefs about the effec-
tiveness of policies. Approaches subsumed under the notion of learning incorporate several theoretical 
concepts like lesson drawing (Rose 1991), Bayesian Updating (Meseguer 2003), or bounded rationality and 
cognitive heuristics (Weyland 2007).
Studies on diffusion are often unclear about the actual impacts of learning processes (cf. Elkins/Simmons 
2005; Meseguer/Gilardi 2009; Mooney 2001). A program may be evaluated positively or negatively, or 
there may be simply no possibility to transfer it (cf. Dolowitz/Marsh 2000; Elkins/Simmons 2005; Rose 
1991: 22). Furthermore, a main problem in applying the concept of learning is to answer the question 
14 From my point of view, these approaches just indicate that socializsation effects can also take place in a shorter 
time period than usually expected in theories relying on the logic of appropriateness.
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about the results national policy-makers care for. Do they really want to find effective solutions for domes-
tic problems? Or is it about economic benchmarks and political results (for example, in terms of payoffs at 
the ballot) (Meseguer 2005: 77)?
Still, existing empirical evidence pinpoints the assumption that governments tend to align themselves with 
policies that can be found in more successful countries (for example Elkins et al. 2006; Meseguer 2006; 
Simmons/Elkins 2004).. Epistemic communities or international organizations can serve as reference as 
well. Organizations like the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) frequently provide country reports, peer reviews, and identify best 
practices which then become powerful international policy instruments for further mutual learning pro-
cesses (cf. Schäfer 2006).
Analytically then, governments are expected to change and transfer policies according to the policies 
implemented in reference countries (successful countries).In the 1990s, for example, Denmark and the 
Netherlands were quite successful in fighting unemployment what provided valuable insight on reforming 
labor markets (Barrell/Genre 1999). However, Lee and Strang (2006) as well as Mooney (2001) show that 
learning can work in both directions with negative experience also causing learning effects. Such processes 
seem to be at work when states abolished interventionist or Keynesian macro-economic policy in favor of 
deregulation and privatization in the last decades (cf. Meseguer 2005). Furthermore, short-term success 
seems to be more important to political decision-makers (cf. Weyland 2007) – a behavior perfectly fitting 
times where knowledge becomes out-dated quickly and where politicians think in terms of legislative pe-
riods and electoral payoffs.
Similar to the emulation mode, assumptions associated with learning are independent of the existence 
of an active promoter of policies (cf. Börzel/Risse 2009). That is to say, an updating of causal beliefs and 
learning about the effectiveness and performance of policies can be caused by mutual observations. Here, 
different assumptions exist regarding the question which problem-solving approach has to be adopted. In 
other words: Where do governments look for information and how do they weigh them? Usually, govern-
ments are only supposed to converge in their policy choices if all available information is considered and 
weighted to the same degree (cf. Holzinger/Knill 2005: 783). 
For example, if governments differ in their information processing capacities, if they are neither perfectly 
rational nor do they collect all available information or if the considered experiences show ambiguous 
results, divergence may occur. Correspondingly, some learning frameworks are dealing with cognitive heu-
ristics which emphasize certain short cuts in the governmental search for and evaluation of information 
(Friedkin 1993; Strang/Meyer 1993; Weyland 2007). Searching for policy solutions is still problem-driven, 
but causal beliefs are bound towards specific biases in the inferences and decision-making processes of 
individuals. So, if cognitive short cuts exist and policy-makers are rationally bounded, then learning still 
leads to policy adoption. However, this is a contingent pattern producing divergence rather than increasing 
similarity (cf. Meseguer 2005: 77).
One of the most questionable assumptions in the comprehensive versions of rational learning relates to 
the unrestricted availability of information and the costs for obtaining them (cf. Meseguer 2006; Weyland 
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2007). Although increasing informational linkages between countries exist, information is supposed to 
be spatially biased with information easier and more readily available from closer states and neighboring 
countries (cf. Grossback et al. 2003; Meseguer 2006; Weyland 2007). From this point of view, discovering 
regional clusters in learning effects comes to no surprise.
In a similar vein, learning effects can also depend on the recipient’s information processing capacities (cf. 
Shipan/Volden 2008). National governments have usually different technical and administrative capacities 
at their disposal when it comes to developing, drafting, and implementing policy proposals (cf. Polidano 
2000). For instance, some parliaments are supported by scientific services when it comes to drafting legisla-
tive proposals (cf. Mooney 1994). Even in situations where clear-cut information on cause-and-effect rela-
tionships exist, policy makers might not update their causal beliefs due to their limitations when collecting 
and processing information. In other words, useful findings do not always climb the “ladder of research 
utilization” (Landry et al. 2001).
In addition, inferential short cuts can refer to the influence of actor’s prior beliefs and cultural factors 
that have an impact on learning outcomes (Meseguer 2005: 75; Weyland 2005). Learning is based on the 
processing and interpretation of information and the communication on causal relationships. The outcome 
of this process also depends on an actors’ prior belief, meaning that an actor’s cultural and ideological 
imprinting influences his decoding of information. In this regard, learning processes can be conditioned 
by country-group-effects (for example, “family of nations”) as in the case of anti-smoking policies and the 
diffusion of second hand smoking restrictions in the English-speaking countries of the Republic of Ireland, 
Scotland, and England (cf. Asare/Studlar 2009). Following this argument, one can expect learning effects to 
be conditioned by the cultural and/or ideological similarity between sender and recipient.
Furthermore, Bayesian learning approaches assume that governments do not distinguish between dif-
ferent informational sources. Given a certain state of information, they rather search for the solution 
that is expected to yield the best results (the most appropriate solution in terms of their preferences). 
Correspondingly, the occurrence of a learning effect might depend on the similarity of the domestic prob-
lems with the observed ones (cf. Heinze/Knill 2008; Rose 1991). In such a case, insights derived from others’ 
experience seem to be more comparable.
Last but not least, governments tend to incorporate policies of other countries into domestic political pro-
grams in situations of high uncertainty (cf. Rose 1991; Simmons/Elkins 2004). If the available policy options 
and the underlying causes and effects are hitherto unknown or not clear, conclusions have to be drawn 
on empirical evidence. The underlying assumption is that the uncertainty condition renders learning from 
peers and others’ experience more likely than a prospective and systematic evaluation based on conven-
tional research and experience (for example, in terms of pilot projects), which is often too time-consuming 
and costly. Time pressures can multiply this effect.
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3.2	 Conceptualizing	Externalities
Externalities characterize diffusion mechanisms based on setting positive and/or negative incentives for 
the adoption of certain policies that are manipulating and influencing utility calculations of domestic 
policy-makers. From this point of view, externalities refer to the cost and benefits those external policies 
cause for decision-makers (cf. Abbott/Snidal 2001; Braun/Gilardi 2006; Elkins/Simmons 2005; Lazer 2001). 
Externalities put adaptive pressure on domestic actors by altering the material payoff structure associated 
with pursuing a specific policy. This will lead to an adjustment of the cost-benefit ratio and the decision 
calculus of actors that, in turn, will influence their interests and desires to which policy to adopt.
The two main concepts belonging to this category of diffusion mechanisms are competition and coercion. 
While the latter concept describes situations where governments are obliged to adopt certain policies (for 
example, in the case of legal requirements and the compliance with international law), diffusion research 
mainly focuses on processes of competition and their externalities affecting domestic policy-makers (for 
example Boehmke/Witmer 2004; Sharman 2008).15 In this regard, externalities are supposed to relate to 
policy areas characterized by institutional and trade-related competition as in the case of economic policy 
(cf. Scharpf 1997b).16
Competition then describes pressures stemming from the growing political and economic interdepen-
dences between different economies (in terms of the mobility of capital, goods, and services) and their 
impact on the payoff structures associated with the pursue of different policies. Regulatory competition 
between different constituencies leads to the mutual adjustment of policies regarded as competitive. 
Rather than prescribing any institutional model, countries engage in a constant competition for inter-
national investments and therefore need to keep their economies competitive (cf. Drezner 2005). From 
this point of view, the actions of national governments create competitive pressures on each other to 
reform national institutions and policies, and to improve and enhance their effectiveness and efficiency. 
Consequently, one can expect government’s decision-making to depend on the policies adopted by com-
petitors. A prominent example refers to the impact of global integration on domestic taxation or social 
expenditures (cf. Jahn 2006).
In a similar vein, international factors can cause a redistribution of resources and domestic adjustment 
can stem from positive or negative incentives set by external actors. For example, federal governments or 
international organizations can use financial incentives17 to promote certain policies (cf. Schimmelfennig 
2007; Welch/Thompson 1980). Some of the most prominent examples are the World Bank (WB) and 
the European Union (EU). Both organizations provide conditional funding linked to carrying out specific 
15 Some authors also incorporate coercive adaption processes such as legal obligations, economic sanctions, or 
international political pressure forcing governments to adopt certain policies into the study of diffusion (e.g. 
Dobbin et al. 2007). Following our initial focus on non-coercive diffusion mechanisms, I do not deal with this kind 
of causal mechanisms.
16 Interestingly, this does not only apply to trade-related policies, but also to policies that have an economic dimen-
sion like moral policies (cf. Berry/Baybeck 2005) or higher education policy (cf. Heinze/Knill 2008).
17 This causal argument does not only apply to financial instruments. Competitive pressures and mutual adjustment 
can be increased with benchmarking instruments.
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projects and/or policy reforms. The WB provides credits to promote economic development, but these 
often depend on specific measures to be implemented in the recipient country (for example, privatizing 
public sectors). The EU also runs financial action programs like the European Regional Development Funds 
(ERDF). However, another way of influencing domestic policies is its accession policy as complying with the 
acquis	communautaire is a condition for granting full EU membership. 
Rather than being a sufficient condition for policy change, vertical explanations can serve as necessary 
conditions that promote patterns of mutual adjustment. This assumption is supported by recent studies 
in diffusion research, finding only a modest influence of vertical incentives in terms of resource distribu-
tion (cf. Daley/Garand 2005; Sugiyama 2008; Weyland 2007). External actors like federal governments can 
merely propel subordinated governments to enact certain policies, but the actual implementation is not 
an automatism and depends on actor’s motivations (cf. Sugiyama 2008: 212).18
Recently, authors point to externalities stemming from cooperative advantages when having compatible 
policies and common standards (Abbott/Snidal 2001; Braun/Gilardi 2006; Elkins/Simmons 2005; Lazer 
2001). For example, as the US state of California adopted strict emission standards for cars, it became ben-
eficial for other US states (and even European countries) to adopt these standards. The Californian market 
was important enough to gain cooperative benefits outweighing the costs for adopting to this common 
technical standard (Vogel 1997).
From this point of view, the standards of cooperative and trading partners seem to have a significant im-
pact on one’s payoff structures.192Furthermore, assuming that countries compete for shares on the same 
markets, some expect that countries trading with the same third parties are moving in the same direction. 
This triadic relationship simply spotlights that political decision-makers anticipate the policies of their com-
petitors in terms of trade. If a developing country is concluding bilateral trade agreements with an indus-
trialized country like the USA, this has implications for other trading partners of the USA in that region as 
well (cf. Neumayer/Plümper 2010). Though empirical evidence questions whether this kind of mechanism 
applies for other policies not directly related to trade (cf. Lee/Strang 2006: 900).
Externalities stemming from competition are supposed to lead to the introduction of more efficient and 
performance-orientated policies, whereas cooperative interdependence does not necessarily imply the 
adoption of competitive measures as usually the payoffs associated with the adoption of a common stan-
dard drive policy adoption. Nevertheless, in both cases, the overall adoption pattern can be described 
as “mutual adjustment” (Scharpf 1997a). Normally, diffusion research finds strong evidence for patterns 
of economically competitive pressure between governments (cf. Boehmke/Witmer 2004; Sharman 2008; 
Shipan/Volden 2008; Simmons et al. 2007). Still, this assumption is quite controversial and has led to for-
mulating a variety of assumptions on what kind of factors condition the domestic impact of competition.
18 This finding is also confirmed by studies on compliance and/or the Europeanization of domestic policies (cf. 
Mastenbroek 2005).
19 Cooperative advantages (and, in return, competitive pressures) seem to become even more pronounced as soon 
as a critical mass is reached and the number of countries with a specific policy is very high (cf. Sharman 2008). To 
put it differently, the size of the target market also matters.
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For example, some authors believe that domestic problem pressure conditions the need for mutual ad-
justments and economic spill-overs (cf. Schmidt 2002: 898). Usually, it can be expected that economically 
stronger and more competitive states are less susceptible to transfer policies from smaller, economically 
less threatening states (cf. Shipan/Volden 2008). The economic systems of larger states are more diverse, 
thus, they can deal with competitive pressure in one policy field more easily. Moreover, the economic pos-
sibilities of smaller states to compete with larger states seem to be limited and, therefore, less threatening 
when it comes to economic competition.
Likewise, competitive pressure is supposed to be stronger in states that are economically integrated and 
more trade-dependent (cf. Holzinger/Knill 2005). However, this is not a necessity. For example, despite 
its open economy, Switzerland was very successful in dealing with global economic pressure due to its 
corporatist arrangements mediating domestic problem pressure (cf. Katzenstein 1985). The underlying 
logic is that competition alters the payoff structure, but the costs for keeping existing policies and ignoring 
competitive pressure will be much higher in times of economic and similar policy-specific vulnerability. 
3.3	 Conceptualizing	Socialization
Normatively, rules might be followed as they are interpreted as legitimate. But they might also be followed 
as actors belief them as being true. For example, based on scientific knowledge or own experience, actors 
cognitively link problems and situations with distinct approaches (March/Olsen 2006). To put if differently, 
agents might internalize normative beliefs and practices as well as group affiliations (cf. Abdelal et al. 2006; 
Johnston 2005: 1032f). In such situations, actors accept the group norms as given and adopt their desires 
and identities to the ones of the community. In this regard, diffusion in terms of socialization clearly frames 
the cognitive dimension of appropriate rules (cf. March/Olsen 2006) as it relates to the internalization of 
shared beliefs. Choosing policies based on conscious instrumental calculation is replaced by a normative 
rationality. 
Similar arguments can be found in concepts like normative isomorphism (DiMaggio/Powell 1991), social 
or complex learning (Hall 1993), taken-for-grantedness (Braun/Gilardi 2006), or type II internalization 
(Checkel 2005). Another way of changing normative beliefs is promoting ideas as legitimate or true through 
reason-giving as in the case of persuasion and arguing (cf. Risse 2000).
The basic idea behind conceptualizations based on the idea of socialization is that actors interacting with 
each other develop shared beliefs and internalize common norms. This, in turn, shapes actor’s perceptions 
on the legitimacy of norms and policies and might lead to a redefinition of actor’s identities and belief 
systems due to the internalization of norms (cf. Checkel 2005; Finnemore/Sikkink 1998). Although socializa-
tion does not directly lead to policy change, the outcome might be the adoption and transfer of specific 
policies. Similar to the assumption on cultural short cuts, actors have to decode situations and to interpret 
how to act accordingly. This process rests upon the actors’ normative beliefs on the appropriateness of 
action and policies.
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Research on socialization often highlights the role of international organizations in promoting policies (for 
example Finnemore/Sikkink 1998; Kelley 2004). International institutions like the EU or the OECD can ex-
hibit influence on national actors in the policy-making process, eventually leading to norm internalization 
and community-based behavior, especially in processes dominated by expertise and technocratic aspects 
(cf. Radaelli 2000; Martens/Jakobi 2007). An environment characterized by regular and frequent interac-
tion of people having a similar professional background seems to be particularly prone to develop common 
norms. A prominent example is the development of ideas on the European Monetary Union (cf. Verdun 
1999).
However, the most prominent branch within diffusion research with regard to socialization deals with the 
role of international norm diffusion (cf. Graham et al. 2008). Here, scholars point to intergovernmental or 
transnational networks serving as a platform for joint decision-making and exchange between politicians, 
experts, bureaucrats, and private stakeholders (cf. Simmons/Elkins 2004: 10; Haas 1992). Such institutional 
configurations characterized by the exchange of information and experiences can cause persuasion and 
socializing effects, leading to a change of normative beliefs and expectations on the appropriateness of 
actions (cf. Eising 1999; Kohler-Koch 1999; Börzel/Risse 2003). Correspondingly, one can expect diffusion 
effects due to (shared) membership in groups and organizations, but also regarding direct, bilateral interac-
tions between states (cf. Simmons/Elkins 2004: 180).
Existing tests of socialization and of the interaction hypothesis showed mixed empirical results. Whereas 
some authors are very skeptical about normative explanations (for example Weyland 2007) or could only 
find few effects linked to the interaction in communication networks (for example Simmons/Elkins 2004), 
others found evidence pointing to the importance of socialized norms and professional networks when it 
comes to explain policy diffusion (for example Lee/Strang 2006; Sugiyama 2008). Although prerequisites for 
successful norm internationalization are seemingly high (cf. Finnemore/Sikkink 1998; Zürn/Checkel 2005), 
a strong and sustainable ideational impact is usually associated with successful socialization. Its precondi-
tions often relate to the institutional setting of the interactions and the properties of the recipient.
Usually, people expect a stronger impact of norms that are highly institutionalized in the international 
system, for example, in international law or international organizations. From this point of view, social-
ization effects might also be dependent on the degree of interaction (cf. Finnemore/Sikkink 1998: 900; 
Sharman 2008). Furthermore, with respect to norm internationalization, professions serve as powerful 
agents or entrepreneurs (cf. Mintrom 1997; Finnemore/Sikkink 1998: 900; Teodoro 2009). Especially in 
cases of frequent interactions involving joint working groups on technical tasks, trust as well as normative 
and political convergence is gradually generated (see also Holzinger/Knill 2005). From this point of view, 
one can expect that socialization effects depend on the kind of network actors are involved in. Professional 
and issue-specific networks should serve as a more suitable environment to develop and exchange shared 
understandings and beliefs on the appropriateness of policies.
To put it differently, the fit between existing domestic norms and normative claims seems to influence 
actor’s openness to new norms and whether they are susceptible for socialization effects (cf. Börzel/Risse 
2003). Here, one can expect socialization processes to be more successful if the interacting actors have 
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rather similar and homogenous cognitive frames, meaning the community is less heterogeneous. These 
arguments lead back to the initial argument that norm internalization is much more likely in professional 
contexts such as epistemic communities (cf. Simmons et al. 2007).
3.4	 Conceptualizing	Emulation
Emulation basically describes situations where actors simply copy models exemplified by others to increase 
the legitimacy of policy choices.201On an international scale, emulation relates to legitimacy pressures 
stemming from the misfit between broadly acclaimed norms and policies and their domestic counterparts. 
These may originate from the desire of national policy-makers to keep pace with others and to increase 
social rewards, but may also result from the need to legitimate one’s structures and policies compared 
to international norms and practices (cf. Finnemore/Sikkink 1998; Meyer et al. 1997). In turn, the clash 
between international and domestic norms can create additional pressure finally leading to policy changes 
on the domestic scene, too. For example, even unconsolidated democratic regimes such as the Ukraine 
adopted the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1994 for achieving a better international reputation (Cortell/
Davis 2000: 82). So, instead of internalizing external norms as in the case of socialization, policy adoption 
in case of emulation results from the simple imitation and copying of norms and policy solutions found 
elsewhere (cf. Bennett 1991; DiMaggio/Powell 1991; Simmons/Elkins 2004). 
In other words, rather than changing one’s beliefs on the appropriateness of a specific policy, emulation 
patterns stem from a change in the reputational payoffs linked with the embracing of a certain norm and 
policy. Then, the altered ideational conditions influence the actors’ desires to conform to a rule or norm. 
Following role-conforming behavior then results in adopting policies associated with the reference norms, 
but can also result in pure symbolism (cf. Gustafsson 1983) or blame avoidance (Bennett 1991: 223). For 
example, official commitments to the non-proliferation of arms often do not match the domestic imple-
mentation of these ideas (cf. Solingen 2007).
That means copying international models must not always stem from searching for effective solutions or 
an advanced understanding of the underlying causal relationships to given problems as it is assumed in the 
case of learning. Policy transfer in mimetic processes is rarely purposive and goal-orientated as explanatory 
rationales focus on peer pressure and reputation as drivers (Meseguer 2005: 78).
Mechanisms based on the logic of emulation refer to a bunch of concepts ranging from norm cascades 
(Finnemore/Sikkink 1998), mimetic isomorphism (DiMaggio/Powell 1991), mimicking (Johnston 2005) or 
type I internalization (Checkel 2005), symbolic imitation (Gustafsson 1983), bandwagoning, threshold or 
tipping point models (cf. Granovetter 1978; Schelling 1978) to herding (Hirshleifer/Teoh 2003; Levi-Faur 
2002).21
20 See footnote ten.
21 Some authors doubt that emulation is a mechanism on its own, but rather a mixture of socialization and learning 
(cf. Graham et al. 2008: 24). Still, it has different implications and underlying assumptions compared to a (ratio-
nal) learning model or socialization.
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Most scholars dealing with policy diffusion associate a strong impact of herding effects, geographically 
proximate peers, and global norms on cross-national policy adoption (cf. Daley/Garand 2005; Lee/Strang 
2006; Shipan/Volden 2008). Nevertheless, empirical evidence also points to the limited impact of emu-
lation in terms of the depth of change as policy adoption usually remains at the surface. For example, 
Cohen--Vogel and Ingle show that emulating policy adoption usually relates to the agenda setting and 
policy-formulation process, but dilutes in the domestic decision-making process (2007). In a similar vein, 
Boehmke and Witmer show that emulation can cause the adoption of a policy, but not its expansion (2004). 
In accordance with these findings, some authors refer to emulation as being a more short-lived diffusion 
process whose impact on the diffusion of policies diminishes with time (cf. Shipan/Volden 2008).
In relation to emulation processes, authors often distinguish reputational cascades depending on the 
standing of the sender (cf. Simmons/Elkins 2004). Broadly speaking, governments tend to emulate peers 
with which they share the same ideological (cf. Grossback et al. 2003), cultural (cf. Elkins/Simmons 2005), 
or regional (cf. Grossback et al. 2003) background, whereas other accounts refer to the emulation of pio-
neering states (cf. Lee/Strang 2006; Stone 2004), 
Furthermore, international norms and standards might also serve as templates for policies to be emulated 
and transferred by national governments. The underlying assumption is that international norms prove 
to be of higher legitimacy than domestic ones and, therefore, change the legitimacy-driven behavior of 
national actors in favor of the internationally acclaimed policy (cf. Finnemore/Sikkink 1998; Meyer et al. 
1997). International league tables can also result in adaption pressure on domestic arrangements as na-
tional governments have to legitimate the status not only in domestic politics, but internationally as well 
(Kern et al. 2000).
However, emulation processes are not necessarily dependent on the existence of a peer or the influence of 
an active norm promoter (cf. Checkel 2005). In this regard, countries often rely on the number of followers 
as an indicator for social acceptance in a given context (cf. Hirshleifer/Teoh 2003; Levi-Faur 2002; Meseguer 
2005). Correspondingly, one can expect emulation processes to be triggered by the sheer number of coun-
tries adopting a specific policy. The changing number of policy followers serves as an indicator for the 
legitimacy of a policy in normative terms. 
Some authors assume a saturation effect, except for constellations in which the number of countries that 
have adopted that policy is already on a very high level (cf. Knill 2005). In a similar vein, some authors 
assume that emulation effects become more pronounced as soon as a critical mass (Sharman 2008) or 
threshold (Finnemore/Sikkink 1998: 901; Simmons/Elkins 2004) is reached.
Still, a final evaluation of emulation mechanisms is difficult as some authors question the impact of global 
norms and symbolic and normative imitation at all (for example Grossback et al. 2003; Simmons/Elkins 
2004; Weyland 2007). Additionally, theoretical expectations often overlap with assumptions on bounded 
rationality and cognitive short cuts in terms of learning. For example, the expectation that countries emu-
late neighboring states overlaps with the assumption that cognitive short cuts exist in learning as far as 
the language and/or nearness of countries to be learnt from are concerned (Weyland 2007). Furthermore, 
explanatory power seems to vary with other forms of emulation, for example, emulation due to cultural 
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similarity seems to have less explanatory power (cf. Elkins et al. 2006). Here, formulating hypotheses on 
the interaction between diffusion variables and conditioning factors could help to disentangle overlapping 
explanations.
Copycatting the behavior of others to increase the legitimacy of policy choices might have comparative 
advantages against more demanding forms of policy adoption, especially in cases characterized by a high 
degree of uncertainty concerning the effects of certain policy measures or high transaction costs relating to 
information gathering and time pressure (Bennett 1991: 223; Hall 1993). Such situations can relate to criti-
cal junctures and shocks, but also to high degrees of problem pressure or political uncertainty (for example, 
due to upcoming elections) (cf. Nicholson-Crotty 2009; Tsebelis 2002).
Authors also pinpoint circumstances limiting the impact of diffusion mechanisms such as the characteris-
tics of the recipient. In this regard, one can expect bigger states to emulate less than small states as they 
usually consider themselves as referential for others (cf. Shipan/Volden 2008). In a similar way, the impact 
of reputational cascades depends on the standing of the sender (cf. Simmons/Elkins 2004). Governments 
have different degrees of international reputation. For example, a country often quoted to have a mixed 
reputation in the Arab world is the USA.
Last but not least, actors have to link norms and policy choices (cf. Klotz 1995: 27; Checkel 1998: 337). As 
Levi-Faur points out – even if structural forces of change can be considered as global – domestic actors have 
to interpret and to project external stimuli (Levi-Faur 2005). Thus, in cases where reference norms are fuzzy 
or even ambiguous and highly contested, a clear-cut interpretation of social rewards turns out to be quite 
difficult (cf. Finnemore/Sikkink 1998; Wiener 2007). From this point of view, emulation effects already 
imply a certain degree of shared beliefs, meaning that socialization took place in the past.
4.  Concluding Remarks
This paper addresses theoretical issues concerning the causes and effects of diffusion processes. In this 
regard, several strands of research have been considered, namely literature on policy diffusion as well as 
insights and approaches on policy transfer, policy convergence, isomorphism, Europeanization, and alike. 
Based on a systematic mapping of diffusion mechanisms, causal pathways and factors accounting for dif-
fusion effects have been presented. As a matter of fact, the paper does not only streamline and review the 
existing state of the art, but developed a systematic and comparative framework of diffusion mechanisms. 
This framework might serve as a starting point for future research. It can be easily used for analyzing any 
policy that might be subject to diffusion processes by extracting hypothesis on the link between variables 
triggering diffusion processes and policy adoption. All in all, four diffusion mechanisms and (some of) their 
scope conditions are discussed and identified.
In doing so, the framework reflects the perspective of most approaches regarding the analysis of processes 
and causal mechanisms while the purpose of this project is to explain the patterns and outcomes of dif-
fusion and not the causal mechanisms as such. Nevertheless, we need to conceptualize these underlying 
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causal mechanisms to formulate adequate hypothesis on when and how international, national, and pol-
icy-specific factors influence diffusion effects such as policy change and adoption.
Here, the major problem comes from disentangling the multiple pathways through which diffusion might 
take place. As long as theoretical assumptions remain distinct from each other this does not necessarily 
cause problems when using statistical methods (cf. Braumoeller 2003). However, the literature on diffusion 
mechanisms is (partly) based on overlapping theoretical assumptions. Hence, to avoid theoretical confu-
sion, diffusion mechanisms are constructed systematically according to a) the underlying logic of social 
action (normative or instrumental rationality); and b) the theorized impact on the constituency for actors’ 
decisions (changing actors’ beliefs or structural conditions). Causal propositions then refer to potentially 
explanatory factors plausibly indicating changing beliefs and conditions.
This paper joins many other attempts to conceptualize diffusion processes and their impacts in an integra-
tive and systematic framework. Certainly, each of them has validity. For example, Simmons and Elkins have 
distinguished at least thirty diffusion processes in the literature (2005). Hence, the mapping provided is 
just a selection of the main mechanisms to be found in the literature. Of course, it is possible to classify 
differently since, for example, the notion of learning as applied here is quite instrumental. Other forms 
of learning such as social learning (Hall 1993) are subsumed under the heading of socialization.221Talking 
about quite broad and ideal categories, these could be split up into sub-mechanisms (cf. Checkel 2006; 
Zürn/Checkel 2005). Yet, it would also be possible to find different analytical dimensions to disentangle 
the mechanisms (cf. Braun/Gilardi 2006; Simmons/Elkins 2004; Schimmelfennig 2007). Furthermore, one 
could add other mechanisms leading to the diffusion of policies: Parallel problem pressure might indepen-
dently lead to the same policy output (cf. Knill/Lenschow 2005) or governments might learn from their own 
experience in the past (cf. Volden et al. 2008).
The ultimate test for every causal argument is its application to empirical research. So, the question re-
mains how to test the causal propositions empirically. How could a research design look like? Going into 
detailed discussion of issues such as case selection and operationalization would certainly go beyond the 
scope of this paper. Yet, recent attempts of other scholars have already demonstrated the usefulness of 
mechanism-based and comparative frameworks in statistical analysis (for example Boehmke/Witmer 2004; 
Daley/Garand 2005; Dobbin et al. 2007; Shipan/Volden 2008; Simmons/Elkins 2004). Still, it looks like that 
three methodological innovations are especially promising to contribute to the comparative analysis of 
diffusion processes. First, the rather statistically orientated research on policy diffusion is increasingly using 
computational simulations to deal with causal processes (cf. Mooney 2001; Braun/Gilardi 2006;). These 
simulations can be used to generate additional insights on how the parameters accounting for diffusion 
processes interact and what the overall patterns would look like. Second, studies on diffusion increasingly 
utilize a directed dyads approach to deal explicitly with the direction of policy change and relational vari-
ables by identifying potential senders and recipients of policy ideas (cf. Berry/Berry 2007; Gilardi/Fuglister 
2008; Volden 2006). Third, some scholars try to strengthen causal inference by mixing different quantita-
tive and qualitative methods in a complementary way. Here, plural methodological approaches usually try 
22 From my point of view, these approaches just indicate that socialization effects can also take place in a shorter 
time period than usually expected in theories relying on the logic of appropriateness.
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to integrate statistics with case studies (for example Karch 2007) or formal models (for example Franzese/
Hays 2008).
Nevertheless, the paper already contributes to the analysis of policy diffusion processes in several ways. 
First, taking a closer look on the literature, several intersections between existing conceptualizations of 
causal mechanisms are demonstrated.
 Second, rather than constructing theoretical arguments according to research strands, the discussion aims 
at disentangling and reviewing systematically the relevant literature by referring to a causal logic. This is 
exemplified by the mapping of theoretical arguments according to the underlying assumption on the logics 
and the determinants of social actions and decisions. 
Third, the approach aims at a broad theoretical approach by considering both rationalist as well as con-
structivist reasoning in explaining the effects of policy diffusion. However, rather than mixing different 
theoretical arguments under one framework, the aim is to be keep them apart and to be more specific 
by employing clear-cut expectations on when and how actors adopt external policies. If the rationalist–
constructivist divide is more about choosing different analytical tools than opposing ontological interpreta-
tions (cf. Fearon/Wendt 2002), mixing both kinds of arguments under one single (utilitarian or constructiv-
ist) framework would foil analytical clarity, especially as no researcher can study everything at once. 
Fourth, the paper avoids equating causal mechanisms with explanatory variables (cf. Gerring 2010). The 
discussion of the underlying causal chain allows for testing intervening steps (or variables) in future re-
search. For example, examining variables on the micro-level of the causal chain could help to answer the 
question whether actors really changed their causal beliefs).
Fifth, the research design is very specific concerning its theoretical scope; that is to say, it is dealing with 
domestic decision-making and national governments as well as the adoption of policies due to voluntary 
diffusion processes. Often studies fail to theoretically clarify the causal mechanisms to be examined or mix 
diffusion mechanisms with more coercive forms of policy spread. 
Sixth, the testing and the application of the described mechanisms will offer us more insights into the 
relationship between the considered explanatory factors, pointing to the question: What is the interplay 
between international, national, and policy-specific variables in determining patterns of diffusion? This will 
finally help to systematically integrate different theoretical arguments in an interactive model.
Of course, the proposed classification is no panacea. Some would argue that it does not make sense to 
analytically distinguish theoretical arguments that might not be disentangled empirically. It is probably 
right that certain explanatory factors partly overlap. For example, as three of the four described mecha-
nisms have in common that their function mainly rests on communication and the exchange of information 
between national and transnational actors, it comes to no surprise that their conceptualizations refer to 
ideological and/or cultural arguments. A crosscutting assumption is that culturally similar actors decode 
information in a similar way.
26 | KFG Working Paper No. 34 | December 2011 
Also, in some cases different levels of analysis exist. In some conceptualizations change is actually induced 
on the micro-level. For testing diffusion mechanisms based on altered beliefs one would preferably have 
data on actors’ beliefs and attitudes over time. Therefore, it is correct that the proposed models still have 
to prove their applicability and robustness in empirical tests. However, from my point of view, this is rather 
an argument for analytical clarity. As causal propositions are the starting point of empirical analysis, they 
should fulfill formal criteria such as consistency (cf. Gerring 2005) as long as they can be empirically falsi-
fied. To put it differently, rather than adjusting theories to methodological problems, we should strive for 
better data.
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The Kolleg-Forschergruppe - Encouraging Academic Exchange and 
Intensive Research
The Kolleg-Forschergruppe (KFG) is a new funding programme laun-
ched by the German Research Foundation in 2008. It is a centrepie-
ce of the KFG to provide a scientifically stimulating environment in 
which innovative research topics can be dealt with by discourse and 
debate within a small group of senior and junior researchers. 
The Kolleg-Forschergruppe „The Transformative Power of Europe“ 
brings together research on European affairs in the Berlin-Branden-
burg region and institutionalizes the cooperation with other univer-
sities and research institutions. It examines the role of the EU as pro-
moter and recipient of ideas, analyzing the mechanisms and effects 
of internal and external diffusion processes in three research areas:
• Identity and the Public Sphere
• Compliance, Conditionality and Beyond
• Comparative Regionalism and Europe’s External Relations
